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I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Petroleum" is a primary energy source for fiiodern industries. It is
an important material for chemical industries as well as a vital
* Grateful acknowledgment is made to the International Journal of Estaurine and
Coastal Law (published by Graham & Trottman Ltd., London) for permissiodi to publish the
Article in the United States. All references to Chinese writings are in Chinese unless otherwise
indicated. The English translation is the author's.
** Visiting Professor, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, California,
U.S.A.
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strategic material. It is cheaper, easier to transport and more efficient.
Since the 1970's, oil has become not only the primary source of
energy in the world industrial structure; it is also being used as a
political weapon affecting the international politics and economic
relations between nations. It has been more than a hundred years
since oil was first discovered, but its becoming the principal source
of energy in the energy structure occurred only recently, about a
decade or two ago. At present, oil represents 48% and 45% respec-
tively of the world energy production and consumption' and therefore
still ranks first in the overall energy structure. Given the present level
of technology and economic feasibility, the world's recoverable oil
reserves are estimated to be 87.3 billion tons which can be exploited
for 28 years.2 Of course this does not mean that the earth contains
just that much oil but is referring to that portion of the reserves
that is known and recoverable. The earth's potential oil reserves are
estimated to be 270 billion tons. 3
However, due to the uneven distribution of oil Kesources on the
earth, the Middle East region alone accounts for about 57% of the
world's total oil reserves. The eight countries, i.e. Saudi Arabia, the
Soviet Union, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, the
United States, and Libya actually make up 68% of the world's total
oil reserves. Also, half of the world's proven oil reserves are con-
centrated in a few super oil fields, such as Ghawar (Saudi Arabia),
Burgan (Kuwait), Rumala (Iraq), etc. about 37 oil fields in all. 4 What
is ironical is the fact that the big oil producers which are mostly
developing countries do not consume too much oil while the industrial
countries which do not produce too much oil are the big oil consum-
ers, and they alone take up about 80% of the world's oil consump-
tion.5
China has been an oil-producing country since the 1960's. Chinese
oil production increased at an average rate of 24.6 percent from 1963
through 1974.6 Production reached the plateau in 1979 producing
1. Cai, The World's Petroleum Prospects, People's Daily (Chinese version), (Beijing),
Feb. 18, 1981, at 7. People's Daily is the Chinese Communist Party organ published in Beijing
and circulated worldwide. It usually reflects the official view of the Chinese Government.
Unless otherwise indicated, the People's Daily and the People's Daily Overseas Edition is the





6. S.S. HARiusoN, S.S., CaNA, On., AND AsIA: Coii*cT AinAD? 13 (1977).
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108 million tons of crude oil and ranked the ninth among the major
oil-producing countries of the world.7 However, China's oil prospects
are not as rosy as was predicted a few years ago by oil analysts.
Various figures, such as 400-million, 440-million, ahd 450-million
tons were then projected for oil production by 1980, 1985, and 1988
respectively, and the projected annual growth rate ranged from 11%
to 20%0. s According to Chinese official statistics, China produced
124.8 million tons of crude oil in 1985, 23.5 million tons more than
1981, an annual average growth of 5.3 percent over the five year
period. 9 The total crude oil production for 1986 was 130.57 million
tons, an increase of 4.6% over that of 198510 and made China the
world's 6th largest oil producer. However, China is a big country
with a population of more than one billion people. It is suffering
from a chronic shortage of energy to support its modernization
program. Reports in the public media are calling for a drive to save
energy in industry as well as in agriculture and daily life. Various
oil-saving methods were proposed at the National Energy Conference
convened in Nanking in 1980." The Chinese media carried numerous
articles calling for saving on oil, and replacing oil with coal, as
domestic oil production is still low compared with some countries in
spite of the fact that a certain portion of oil is being exported,' 2 and
there is still a shortage of proven oil reserves. One editorial said that
there was no prospect of a big increase in oil production in the near
future and that China must resolutely implement the coal-centered
energy policy. 13 No major change in China's energy structure is in
sight.14
This emphasis on coal-centered energy policy is significant in three
aspects. First, it is an indication of a.shortage in energy supply for
domestic industrial development and transportation. Some factories
were forced to operate half-day or stop production, and imported
foreign technology has not been fully utilized because of energy
7. Die Zeit, (West Germany) May 23, 1980, reported in Reference News (Cai-kao Xiao-
Xi), (Beijing), June 7, 1980; People's Daily, April 16, 1982, at 2. (The Reference News is a
tabloid paper published in Chinese in Beijing for internal circulation in China and covering
reports published in the foreign press around the world.)
8, HwuusoN, supra note 6, at 19.
9. China Trader Weekly Bulletin, Jan. 27, 1986, at 4.
10. People's Daily, Overseas Ed., Sept. 5, 1987, at 6.
11. Guan-Ming Ri-Bao, Jan. 23, 1981, at 4.
12. China exported 28 million tons of crude oil in 1986. People's Daily, Overseas Ed.,
Apr. 18, 1987, at 2.
13. People's Daily, Feb. 18, 1981.
14. 4 Intertrade, June 1987, No. 9 at 14.
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shortages.15 This also, partly at least, accounted for the cancellation
of some purchase contracts with foreign businessmen a few years
ago because there was not enough energy supply for such imported
factories. Although China's coal and oil deposits are believed to be
enormous, 6 they have not yet been fully explored, not to speak of
their recovery which will involve advanced technology and substantial
investment. The realization of China's pledge to build "some 10
more oilfields as big as Taching by the turn of the century" 17 seems
remote and fraught with formidable obstacles.
Secondly, this coal-centered energy policy emphasis is an attempt
to correct the leftist line pursued by the radicals in the late 1960's
and early 1970's on China's energy policy. The so-called "Gang of
Four" downgraded the importance of foreign technology and in-
vestment to China's industrial development and stigmatized the export
of oil to earn needed foreign currency as a "traitorous act." It was
during this period that China turned the coal into oil-centered energy
policy. Many factories were switched from coal into oil-burning
furnaces resulting in the consumption of a large amount of crude
oil. The Chinese government has since been trying to switch back by
looking for alternative fuels, such as mixtures of coal and oil or
water 18 in order to save oil for other purposes. There is no doubt
that China is facing the threat of an energy crisis. The Beijing-based
Theoretical Information stated that what China needs most is energy,
the lack of which is the most restraining factor in retarding the
nation's modernization target. 9
15. Xue Mu-Quiao, Speech at the International Seminar on World Economy, reported in
Guan-Min Ri-Bao, March 26, 1981, at 4. Currently there is more than 20% of industrial
production capacity which cannot be operated due to shortage of electricity. People's Daily,
Overseas Ed., Aug. 13, 1987, at 1.
16. See infra notes 22 and 23 and accompanying text.
17. Former Chinese Communist Party leader, Hua Kuo-feng's speech on May 9, 1977, in
which he said that "The petroleum department must strive to build some ten more 'Taching
Oifields."' See Chairman Hua Kuo-fengs's Speech at the National Conference on Learning
from Taching in Industry on May 9, 1977, 20 PExur Ray. 15 (1977).
18. Mixtures of ground-up coal and oil or water are being experimented with in China.
The greatest advantage this kind of mixed fuel can offer is that you do not have to convert
the oil-designed boiler, and that would save a lot of money. See Guan-Min Ri-Bao, Jan. 18,
1981 and Newsweek (U.S.), May 18, 1981, at 32-33. According to recent reports released by
China's Energy Saving Office, the reduction of the Nation's dependence on oil-fired power
stations - mainly by swapping to coal - has been very successful. The office will continue to
function until the year 2000. It is intended to transform oil-burning furnaces to use coal,
mostly in electric power stations but also in heavy and light industries, such as steel and
ceramics. China Daily Business Weekly, Jan. 7, 1987, at 1.
19. China Daily, March 12, 1987, at 4.
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. Thirdly, petroleum offers the greatest possibilities for China to
earn foreign currency. By increasing oil output and adopting various
oil-saving methods, China would be able to export more oil and earn
more hard currency-to buy foreign technology.
20
In China coal is still a major source of energy and accounts for
about 70% with oil ranging from 18 to 2-2% and hydroelectric power
less than 2% in the overall energy structure.2' These ratios will remain
unchanged in the foreseeable future. According to the Beijing-based
Theoretical Information, the total coal reserves are estimated.at 1,440
billion tons and account for 13% of the world's total reserves-the
third in the world. However, the per capita share of exploitable coal
deposits is 101 tons, only 40% of the world's average.
2
China's onshore and offshore oil potential is believed to be great.
Western oil analysts estimated a total of onshore and offshore oil
deposits.to be around 72 billion barrels, of which 12 billion barrels
are onshore deposits, and natural gas reserves are estimated to be
19,000 billion, cubic meters.23 Recoverable onshore reserve estimates
were given as 20.3, 33.8, 40, 44.3 and 57 billion barrels24 and
recoverable offshore reserve estimate given as 30 billion barrels.2?
Some foreign oil experts stated that although China might not develop
to be a new !'Middle East," it would become the largest oil producer
in Asia. By the end of the century the daily production target cild
reach five to seven million barrels.26 China is believed to have about
3.5 million sq. km. of oil-bearing sedimentary rocks.27 However,
most have not yet been explored because of technological and finan-
cial problems. The dramatic drop in the annual production growth
rate in the late 1970's and early 1980's was largely due to a shortage
of new recoverable onshore oil reserves. This severe shortage of
20. In 1986 China exported a total of 28 million tons of crude oil. China Daily, Apr. 18,
1987, at 2. Losses due to lower oil prices in 1986 were estimated to be around US$2.5 billion.
However, overall exports for the first 9 months of 1986 rose 14.8% to USS21.4 billion. China
Trade Report, Jan. 1987, at 4.
21. People's Daily, Mar. 11, 1981, at 1.
22. China Daily, Mar. 12, 1987, at 4. Estimated coal reserves ranged widely. People's
Daily, Overseas Ed., reported China's known coal reserves to be close to 4,000 billion tons.
China currently produced a little over 800 million tons of coal annually and ranked second in
the world. People's Daily, Overseas Ed., Sept. 1, 1987, at 1.
23. The Associated Press News Release from China, Mar. 28, 1980, reported in Reference
News, Mar. 9, 1980.
24. Harrison, supra note 6, at 32.
25. Id. at 43.
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proven petroleum reserves is fully borne out by the sharp contrast
between the increase of oil production by 10-fold during the years
1965 to 1980 and that of proven oil reserves by less than 2-fold
during the same period. This imbalance, which was the result of a
.high premium placed on development and low priority on general
geological survey, is the main cause of the dramatic drop in oil
production since 1979. The ratio of 1:10 is the number of drilling
rigs used in geological survey and oil development. This tends to
prove the severe dislocation in the overall planning of exploration
and development of petroleum resources over the past decade.28
It has become evident to Chinese leaders that to reverse the
downward trend in oil production China has to seek some other
means of increasing its production. Although China's onshore oil
reserves are believed to be abundant,29 the rough terrain and harsh
environment in China's remote west, where most oil reserves are
believed to exist, make the exploitation extremely difficult and costly.
In contrast, offshore oil resources are mostly located in shallow-
water areas off the Chinese coast where the average depth of water
range from 26 to 70 meters.3 0 Thus, the cost for offshore oil devel-
opment would not be more expensive than that of onland exploitation
in China's inaccessible Northwest. Going offshore seemed to be the
most feasible option for China after balancing the economic, political
and strategic interests.
China claims to have more than 1.2 million sq. km. of offshore
continental shelf.3 China's extant known sedimentary basins favor-
able for potential exploration cover an area of about 5.5 million sq.
km., with 4.2 million sq. km. on land and 1.3 million sq. km.
offshore. 2 By October 1985, over 500 potential oil and gas bearing
structures had been discovered offshore in which 102 exploratory
wells were drilled, 37 of which are producers and 6 have produced
at a rate of over a thousand tons a day.33
28. Feng, The Prospect for Our Petroleum Resources and the Task of General Survey,
People's Daily, Apr. 16, 1982, at 2.
29. China has an estimated 30 to 60 billion tons of oil reserves, of which land reserves
account for about two-thirds. FoR ION BROADCASt INPoRuATotI SERvIcE [hereinafter FBIS],
Apr. 12, 1982, at KI0.
30. ZfANO Li-FENo, MAmE GEoLGY 71 (Beijing 1980).
31. People's Daily, Apr. 16, 1982, at 2. The Chinese shelf spreads over a vast area with
an estimated I million sq. km. located in water depths of less than 200 meters. Li, China's
Continental Shelf Oil Potential, 16 OcEN ][pusn y 104 (Feb. 1981).
32. 3 Intertrade June 1986, No. 9 at 16.
33. Id.
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Joint offshore exploration with foreign companies has achieved
good results in some areas, such as Pearl river basin area and
Yinggehai area. The joint Japanese and Chinese developed Chengbei
oilfield in Boha Bay started producing in October 1985.34 China's
offshore is generally regarded as the largest area of untapped offshore
oil reserves in. the world. Estimates of the resources vary greatly.
Most of the estimates put the oil reserves in the range between 30
and 100 billion barrels.35 Both Chinese and foreign geologists unan-
imously agree that oil resources in Chinese waters are very rich and
that there are good prospects for oil exploitation. 36
There are important considerations ,which prompted China to invest
in offshore oil exploration and development other than those men-
tioned above. First, China's modernization program needs substantial
foreign exchange, and oil offers the greatest possibilities for earning
foreign currency through export in order to finance the import of
industrial technology. Petrochemical industries can provide synthetic
textiles and other finished products which can in turn be exported.
Second, modernization carries with it burgeoning energy needs, in
industry as well as in agriculture. Farm mechanization would not be
feasible without diesel oil.
Thirdly, oil is an important strategic material and it is of para-
mount importance to develop this material on strategic and political
considerations. As it is, China's oil production is still far from
adequate.37 Fourth, the security consideration prompted China to
turn to offshore development. Most of China's major oil fields are
located in the Northeast- and Northwest where vulnerability to Soviet
attacks is evident given the fact that more than 45 Soviet mechanized
divisions are deployed along 3,000 miles of the Sino-Soviet border
from Vladivosk to Mongolia. The shift to offshore oilfields will
reduce this vulnerability.
Fifth, there is also the advantage in transportation as the offshore
oil fields are close to the industrial centers, thus facilitating transport
of oil both for domestic use and export. And, last but not least, the
participation of foreign, especially U.S. oil companies in the offshore
venture will reinforce China's position in the disputed sea area of
the region where rival claims to offshore rights over petroleum
34. Id.
35. Brown, Tough Terms for Offshore 6H1, CHINA tus. Ray. 34 (July-Aug. 1982).
36. FBIS, Jan. 7, at K4; Apr. 6, at K13, and Apr. 22, at KI0, 1982.
37. People's Daily, Feb.. 18, 1981, at 1; People's Daily, Overseas Ed., Aug. 13, 1987, at
1.
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resources have been most intense, particularly in the South China
Sea. 3 The involvement of foreign companies in China's offshore oil
program will help China establish the legitimacy of its claims in this
area.
It is against the above background that China, pressured by various
economic and political factors as described above, finally decided on
developing offshore petroleum resources as one of its important
measures to cope with these challenges. China started offshore test
drilling as early as 1968 in the Bohai Gulf, and about twenty
exploratory wells had been drilled in the Gulf by 1976, not counting
wells drilled in other offshore areas.39 China is well aware of her
limited technical capabilities, and it is virtually impossible to achieve
on its own the goal of producing oil from the offshore seabed
efficiently and in as short a time as possible without foreign tech-
nological investment.
China is now pursuing an "open door" policy for petroleum
development, both onshore and offshore. By the end of 1986, it had
been seven years since China started its cooperative oil development
with foreign oil enterprises. During this period thirty-three contracts
were signed with fifty-eight oil companies from 12 countries for
offshore drilling covering 150,000 sq. km. It has conducted seismic
belt-surveys in an area stretching out to 320,000 km., drilled 141 oil
wells (oil and gas were discovered in 54 of them), and explored oil
structures at 105 places (oil and gas contents were discovered in 31
places). Investment involved in offshore oil prospecting and devel-
opment in the six years from 1979 to 1986 totalled US$2.42 billion
and 400 million Yuan RMB. 40 In addition, 13 joint ventures were
formed with foreign companies manufacturing support systems for
the offshore development. Foreign expatriates working in oil com-
panies based in China exceeded 820.41
Reports recently released by Chinese Oil Ministry indicate that oil
reserves in the areas along the coast of Northern China account for
about half the country's total reserves. The area is expected to furnish
half of the national output by 1990 which is targeted at 105 million
38. See Yuan, China's Jurisdiction Over its Offshore Petroleum Resources 12 Ocew Dnv.
& ITr'r L. 191 (1983) [hereinafter China's Jurisdiction]; China's Offshore Oil Development:
Analysis from Legal and Geopolitical Perspective, 18 TaX. INT'L L. J. 107 (1983) [hereinafter
China's Offshore Oil].
39. J. Willums, China's Offshore Oil: Application of a Framework for Evaluating Oil
and Gas Potentials under Uncertainty 309 (1975) (Ph.D. Dissertation, MIT).
40. Beijing Rev., Mar. 16, 1987, at 29.
41. People's Daily, Overseas Ed., Dec. 25, 1986, at I.
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tons.42 The area called the Bohai Economic Ring covers 200,000 sq.
km. along the coast of the Bohai Sea and has more than 120 oil
zones, which produced 371 million barrels of crude oil in 1986.
China's five major oilfields-Shengli in Shandong Province, Liaohe
in Liaoning Province, Huabei in Hebei Province, Dagang near the
City of Tianjin and the offshore oil field in the Bohai Sea-are in
this area.43
It was reported that ninety percent of China's crude oil output is
in the eastern part of the country. The oil industry will focus one-
third of its efforts on exploiting oil reserves in that area over the
next few years to boost its output to 150 million tons by 1990.44
Oil exploration will also be accelerated in the Tarim Basin in
Northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in an effort
to discover new reserves during the five-year plan (1986-90). 45 Seven
seismic survey teams of about 1,000 people have been sent to work
in the desert where they have discovered several large uplifts. An
official from the Oil Ministry said, "the Tarim Basin, which has
good geological conditions for oil and natural gas, has attracted the
interest of both Chinese and foreign oil companies."
46
Foreign investment will necessarily involve technological, economic,
and legal considerations. A well-balanced, sound national policy and
law will give incentive to foreign investors to invest in China's-oil
venture, insure smooth implementation of development programs and
attain its ultimate policy objectives. Necessary laws and regulations
will have to be made to regulate the offshore operations and to
ensure adequate legal protection to foreign investors who need a firm
commitment from the Chinese Government in proper legal form to
protect their interests before sinking their funds into the oil venture.
China promulgated the offshore petroleum resources law on Feb-
ruary 10, 1982 entitled "Regulations of the People's Republic of
China on the Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum Resources in Co-
operation with Foreign Enterprises" (hereinafter cited as Regula-
tions)Y This is China's first ocean mineral code since the establishment
42. People's Daily, Overseas Ed., June 20, 1987, at 1. China produced 375,000 tons of
offshore oil in 1986, 281,000 tons more than in 1985. China Daily, Feb. 13, 1987, at 1.
43. China Daily, May 2, 1987, at 1.




47. Regulations on the People's Republic of China on the Exploitation of Offshore
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of the People's Republic in 1949. Thus its significance cannot be
overemphasized. The Regulations establishes a broad framework of
principles ahnd guidelines controlling all aspects of petroleum opera-
tions on the continental shelf and the relationship between the Chinese
National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) and the foreign entities
in their cooperative venture spanning 15 to 30 years, and absorbing
an estimated investment of 20 billion dollars over the next two
decades. 48 The aim of the present paper is to identify and analyze
the major policy issues involved in China's offshore oil development
in light of the offshore oil regulations, recent policy statements and
other relevant laws.
II. THE PHYsIcAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA'S CONTINENTAL
SILF
China's continental coastline begins at the mouth of the Yalu River
on the Chinese-Korean border and ends at the Peilun River on the
Chinese-Vietnamese border. It is very irregular and indented, and
has a total length of more than 18,000 kilometers. 49 The seas facing
China's coast include the Bohai Gulf (or Bay) in the North, the
Yellow and East China Seas in the middle, and the South China Sea
in the south. With the exception of the Bohai which is an internal
sea, the other three seas are marginal seas of the West Pacific.
China's coastal areas are dotted with a myriad of islands numbering
3,416 in all, of which over two-thirds are in the coastal waters of
the East China Sea. The coastlines of these islands including Taiwan
run to more than 10,000 km. in length.50
China's total sea area is about 3.9 million sq. kin.5 1 The Bohai
Gulf, the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea are all situated to the
east of Chinese mainland, and they are sometimes collectively called
the East China Seas. The South China Sea situated to the south of
the mainland is the largest and deepest as well as most complicated
in topography of all the four seas.
Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises was promulgated on February
10, 1982 and came into force on the same day. People's Daily, Feb. 11, 1982, at 4. For a
detailed analysis of the law, see Yuan, China's Offshore Petroleum Resources Law: A Critical
and Interpretive Analysis 16 THE INrER AvToN~A. LAwYER 647 (1982) [hereinafter China's
Offshore Petroleum].
48. U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 23, 1982, at 33.
49. Zhang, supra note 30, at 69.
50. Park, Fishing under Troubled Waters, 2 OcEAN Dav. A INT'L L. 94 (1974).
51. Zhang, supra note 30, at 70.
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China's continental shelf is considered to be one of the most
extensive in the world. In the Bohai Gulf and the Yellow Sea the
continental shelf extends to the entire sea area. In the East China
Sea the shelf extends to most of the sea area, and only the South
China Sea has a narrower- continental shelf. The average water depth
of the outer continental shelf edge is 140 to 160 meters where the
shelf ends and the slope begins.52 The continental shelf is the natural
prolongation of China's land mass which gradually declines from the
northeast toward the southwest, the average gradient being 0002 ' and
its average water depth 45 meters. The topography of the continental
shelf shows traits of continuity. According to the Chinese sources,
about one million square kilometers of the shelf area are believed to
contain rich oil and gas deposits and may prove to be one of the
largest oil fields in the world.5 3
The Bohai. is China's internal'sea surrounded by the Shantung and
Liaotung peninsula. It is the smallest of the -four seas, having an
area of 83,000 sq. km., the average depth being only 26 meters and
the deepest being 78 meters near the Bohai Strait. Ninety percent of
the Gulf area is less than 30 meters in water depth.54 The sedimentary
strata in the Bohai Gulf is several thousand meters thick, of which
the sediments accumulated during the Tertiary period are considered
to be the thickest. This strata is believed to bear abundant oil and
gas deposits and regarded as one of China's important oil reservoirs.
The seabed of the Bohai declines from the south, west and north
sides toward the central shallow basin and the Bohai Strait in the
east, and extends to the entire sea area.
The mouth of the Bohai Gulf is about 45 miles across, but there
are quite a number of small islands studded around the mouth which
cut the entrance into many openings, the widest of which measures
22.5 miles. The importance of the Gulf is self-evident because of its
location in'the industrial center of the country and its adjacency to
the capital of the nation which is less than 100 miles away.
The Yellow Sea is a shallow region enclosed by Korea on the east
and by China on the west and north, and is adjacent to the East
China Sea on the south. It is seventy-five percent enclosed and
relatively shallow with a large amount of land effluent in the water.
The Yellow Sea derives the name from its orange color. It is a typical
52. Id. at 72.
53. Id. at 71.
54. Id. at 73-74.
- 215
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continental shelf sea area of more than 400,000 sq. km., about five
times as big as the Bohai. The bottom of the shelf is quite flat, the
average gradient being 0001 '21 ". The entire sea bottom is charac-
terized by slanting toward the center on the west, north, and east
sides with the Shantung Peninsula projecting into the sea, thus
naturally dividing the Yellow Sea into two parts, the north and the
south, at an average water depth of 38 and 46 meters respectively.
Most of the water in the middle on the eastern side reaches depths
of 138 meters at the deepest and 80 to 90 meters in its adjacency
thus forming a dish-like basin. In the southern part of the Yellow
Sea near the northern Kiangsu are many hidden shoals whose location
and configuration vary with each passing year, the water depth here
not exceeding 20 meters. It is extremely dangerous for navigation in
this region.
Generally speaking, the Yellow Sea region has three shallow basins,
one near Korea and the other two near Chinese mainland, and these
basins have accumulated sedimentary strata as thick as 1,500 meters
which contain enormous organic material and are therefore potential
oil-bearing areas.55 The continental sediments of the Yellow Sea are
mostly terrigenous clastics (sand and silt) washed down into the sea
by rivers of the Chinese mainland and the Korean Peninsula.
Of the four seas in China, the East China Sea is the second
largest-about 750,000 sq. km. in size. It is bounded by China on
the west and by Kyushu and Ryukyu Islands of Japan on the east
and south, and faces Korea and the Yellow Sea on the north. Its
continental shelf area is quite extensive, about 450,000 sq. km., and
its shelf width averages more than two hundred nautical miles. It is
regarded as one of the most extensive shelves in the world. Apart
from the shelf there are the continental slope and the narrow sea
bottom. The average depth is about 350 meters. The continental shelf
of the East China Sea is wide in the north and narrow in the south,
and gradually slants south-eastward, the average gradient being
0001 '17 '' and average water depth 72 meters.56
The seabed topography of the West China Sea is quite similar to
the land topography of the coastal area of southeast China. It
gradually declines toward the southeast, at the end of which the
seabed abruptly falls off with the water depth of less than 200 meters
suddenly plunging to 1,000 - 2,000 meters, thus forming a long strip
55. Id. at 69-78.
56. Id. at 79.
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of depressed ocean bed from the northeast to the southwest-that is
what is called the Okinawa Trough which is 2,719 meters at the
deepest.57
The continental shelf of the East China Sea can be generally
divided into three terraces. The waters in the first, second, and third
terraces are 20, 30-50, and 60-70 meters in depth respectively. The
continental slope extends in a seaward curving arc and is very steep,
at the gradient of 30 in general and 90-100 in isolated cases. The
continental shelf ends at the continental slope that abruptly drops to
the bottoni of the Okinawa Trough, reaching a depth of 2,700 meters
at the deepest near the northeastern part of Taiwan. 51 The sediment
of the seabed strongly suggests potential petroleum deposits.59
The South China Sea, where the Paracel Islands and the Spratly
Islands are situated, is the largest and deepest of all the four seas.
It is surrounded by the Philippine Islands in the east, China in the
north, the Indo-Chinese and Malay Peninsulas in the west, and
Borneo in the south. It has an area of 2.7 million square miles which
accounts for two thirds of China's sea area.60 The average water
depth is about 1,140 meters and the average gradient 0003 '40 ". The
topography of the continental shelf is smooth and flat, the water
depth of the shelf's outer edge is about 170 meters. The continental
slope is spread out under the water depth of between 170 and 3,600
meters, reaching a depth of 3,600 meters at the sea bottom where
the abyssal plain of the South China Sea begins. The water depth
of the South China Sea is over 200 meters for the most part except
for those waters contiguous to the land mass and the islands. Viewed
as a whole, the South China Sea is a sea basin in its own right with
edges relatively high and a deep sunken center. The continental shelf
is 330,000 square kilometers in size, much narrower than that of the
East China Sea and slopes gently. The deepest water depth in the
South China Sea is 5,420 meters. 61 There are numierous coral reefs,
sand banks, and shoals below the waters throughout the entire area,
57. Id. at 80.
58. Id. See also Park, Continental Shelf Issues in the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea,
Occasional Paper No. 15 of the Law of the Sea Institute. (Sept. 1972).
59. Committee for Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian
Offshore Areas of the .Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, 2 Tech. Bull.,
Technical Advisory Group Report 35 (1969).
60. Zhang, supra note 30 at 70.
61. Id. at 83.
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and the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands are just the emerged
parts of these reefs and banks.62
The South China Sea is situated between the Pacific and Indian
Oceans and has been an important part of the sea route from Europe
to the Orient since the 16th century.
III. CHINA'S OFFSHOI JUsDIcTIoNAL DIsPrTs
63
In the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the
Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum Resources in cooperation with
Foreign Enterprises,6 China deliberately avoids being specific in its
statement concerning its jurisdiction over the offshore petroleum
resources. Article 2 of the above Regulations simply states:
All petroleum resources in the internal waters, territorial sea and
continental shelf of the People's Republic of China and in all sea
areas within the limits of national jurisdiction over the maritime
resources of the People's Republic of China are owned by the
People's Republic of China.
The main problem involved in China's jurisdiction over its offshore
resources is the identification and extent of its continental shelf.
There are three countries bordering the Yellow and East China Seas.
They are China, Korea, and Japan. The maritime jurisdiction in this
area consists of three major issues, i.e., territorial sovereignty over
certain islands off the Chinese coast, 65 determination of baselines,
and the legal status of troughs or trenches. Of these three issues, the
toughest is that of the territorial dispute between China and Japan
over the Tiaoyutai Islands (Senkaku Islands in Japanese), a group
of eight uninhabited islets, of which three are barren rocks, all
62. Cheng, The Dispute over the South China Sea Islands, 10 TEx. IlNr'L L. J. 265, 266
(1975).
63. For detailed discussion of this issue, see Yuan, China's Offshore Oil Development:
Problems and Prospects, paper presented at the Proceedings of the 16th Annual Conference
of the Law of the Sea Institute, at 455-64 (1982); Yuan, China's Jurisdiction, supra note 38,
at 191-208; Yuan, China's Offshore Oil, supra note 38, at 107-26; Yuan, China's Sovereignty
Over its Offshore Oil and the New Law of the Sea, paper delivered at the 2nd Workshop on
the Geology and Hydrocarbon Potential of the South China Sea and Possibilities of Joint
Development, published in the Proceedings of the Conference 525-32 (1985).
64. The Regulations were adopted at the Regular Session of the State Council on January
12, 1982 and promulgated by the State Council on January 30, 1982 [hereinafter Offshore
Regulations].
65. China has territorial disputes over the Tiaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands with Japan in the
East China Sea, and Korea and Japan have not yet settled their territorial dispute over Tokdo
(Takeshima) Island in the Sea of Japan. P. Hahm, A Korean Perspective on the Law of the
Sea 4 (1981) (unpublished paper); Park, Oil Under Troubled Waters: The Northeast Asia
Seabed Controversy, 14 HLv. INT'L L. J. 212, 252 (1973).
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situated on the edge of the continental shelf in the East China Sea,
about 120 n.m. northeast of Taiwan. Although both sides have
produced reams of historical documents to prove their sovereignty
over the islands, ample evidence from historical records and events
shows that Chinese reference to the disputed islands dates as far
back as 1403 A.D., when the Tiaoyutai was first mentioned in a
navigation record and the Tiaoyutai Islands had never been a part
of the Ryukyus but were under Taiwan's jurisdiction prior to 1895. 6
The evidence thus far produced tends to tip the scale in favor of
China. As the territorial dispute has always been a sensitive issue,
neither party would give up on what it claims. The only feasible
resolution is to shelve the territorial sovereignty issue and go ahead
with a joint development program. This has been expressly indicated
in Chinese leaders' talks in recent years. 67 The Sino-Japanese joint
oil development has already taken place in the Bohai Gulf where
China and Japan have cooperated in the exploration and development
of oil in the southern waters of the Gulf, and their jointly developed
Chengbei oilfield already started producing oil since October 1985.68
Given the present relationship between China and Japan and the
interdependence of each other in economic and technological coop-
eration, such joint efforts are likely to extend to disputed areas such
as the Tiaoyutai Islands which have no economic value whatever by
themselves except for possible oil reservoirs beneath the seabed.69
With regard to the determination of baselines, it should not pose
any serious problem because most offshore islands in this region are
quite close to the shoreline and follow the general direction of the
coastal configuration except for a few isolated islands off the Hang
Chou Bay, such as Tung Tao (the Eastern Island), the farthest one
from the coast being 69 miles.70
As to the issue of Okinawa Trough in the East China Sea, it
should not become a serious problem now taking into consideration
the. new development in the law of delimitation of continental shelf
66. Park, supra note 58; see also Cheng, The Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Tiao-yu-tai
(Senkaku) Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 221, 253-60
(1974). n
67. Ming Pao (Ming Daily), Apr. 29, 1983, at 1; Lauriat & Liu, Pouring Trouble on Oily
Waters, FAR. E. EcoNr. REv. 21 (Sept. 28, 1979)-.
68. 3 Intertrade, June 1986, No. 9 at 16.
69, For further elaboration on the need for Sino-Japanese economic cooperation, see
Yuan, China's Offshore Oil, supra note 38, at 107-26.
70. Allen & Mitchell, The Legal Status of the Continental Shelf of the East China Sea,
51 OR. L. Rnv. 789, 800 (1972).
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as embodied in the UN 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The
question of whether the seabed of the Okinawa Trough constitutes
a part of the natural prolongation of either state's coast would not
become a stumbling block if and when both parties eventually ratify
the 1982 LOS Convention. The Convention defines the legal conti-
nental shelf in a way that makes the submarine geomorphological
features within 200 miles from shore almost irrelevant.7 1 In addition,
the extent of the East China Sea between China and Japan does not
allow either party to claim 200 n.m. out to the sea because the width
of the East China Sea from east to west is only 140-280 n.m.72 Hence
a median line solution will have to be considered under the new
development in the law of the sea.
In the South China Sea, the potential conflict over access to this
area's mineral resources is more acute and complicated because the
territorial disputes involve many more countries. 73 The main dispute
in this area is between China and Vietnam over the Xisha (Paracel)
and Nansha (Spratly) Islands. China has embarked on a full-scale
development of offshore oil resources on its continental shelf. How-
ever, it has not yet set a limit on its jurisdiction over the continental
shelf, nor has it concluded any maritime boundary agreements with
its neighboring countries. The involvement of the Soviet Union in
the South China Sea complicates the situation in the area. The Soviet
Union is attempting to extend its influence in the region through
participation in offshore oil exploration and development. It accom-
plished its goal by entering into a joint exploration agreement with
Vietnam in the Beibu Gulf (Gulf of Tonkin). 74 This action could be
interpreted as Soviet support for Vietnam in its confrontation with
China.
There is no ready solution to the China-Vietnam territorial dispute
over the two islands in the South China Sea. However, a compromise
might be worked out against the backdrop of Soviet rapprochement
71. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 57 and 76, 3 U.N. Conf. on the Law
of the Sea, A/Conf.62/122 (Oct. 7, 1982).
72. Although it is 300 to 400 miles from north to south and 140 to 280 miles from east
to west, the figures for the total area of the East China Sea vary with different authors. Cf.
Allen & Mitchell, supra note 70 (480,000 sq. kin.); Y.J. MA, LEoAL PROnLEM oF SEABED
BotuNrnxy DEMa-rATioN iN THm EAsT CEaNA SA (Baltimore 1984) (290,348 sq. km.); or
Zhang, supra note 30, at 79 (290,000 sq. kin.).
73. Yuan, supra note 63.
74. An agreement was entered into between Vietnam and five Comecon partners - the
USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovaka, Hungary and Poland - to help Vietnam explore for oil and
other resources in this area for a period of 10 years from 1981 to 1990, Lauriat & Liu, supra
note 67, at 19; see also 136 F~AR E. EcoN. Rav. 74, 75 (May 28, 1987).
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with China which has become increasingly evident since 1983. The
visit of Ivan Arkhipov, first Vice-Chairman of the Council of Min-
isters of the Soviet Union to China in December 1984 and the rapid
development of bilateral trade relations in recent years have clearly
indicated the Sino-Soviet relations are on the mend and improving
at a pace unprecedented since the breakup of relations in the late
1950's. With the above development in perspective, the Sino-Viet-
namese relations are not likely to deteriorate any further in the
foreseeable future.
IV. FOREI GNN INsmNT IN CHINA'S OFFSHoRE OnL DEE LoPmENT
In the late 1950's when serious ideological and policy differences
between China and the Soviet Union erupted into the open, the
Soviets suddenly took repressive measures by tearing up hundreds of
contracts, pulling out their experts and cutting back oil supplies,
hoping in this way to bring China to its knees. But China did not
bow to the Soviet pressure. On the contrary, China got a hard lesson.
Never will China again rely upon a foreign power in its economic
construction.
The term "self-reliance" has been much in vogue in recent years,
not only in China but in Third World countries as well. Some say
that China has been straying off the road of self-reliance since the
death of Chairman Mao Zedong. The Chinese press has since been
reassuring the masses that the present regime is following the teach-
ings of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought in the socialist
construction.75 It does not make any sense to engage in such polemics
if we are to ignore the stark reality that China cannot possibly
achieve its modernization goal efficiently and in as short a time as
possible without mass involvement of foreign investment and tech-
nology. The question is how to strike a balance between domestic
and foreign interests and to what extent foreign technology will be
imported without detriment to its own domestic industries.
China's ambitious offshsore program certainly is big business.
Chinese and foreign oil companies have already sunk a total of some
US $200 million dollars and 400 million Yuan into offshore pros-
75. See Principles of Marxsm Not Outdated, 29 BmnWG Rv. 26 (Dec. 1, 1986); Resolution
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Guiding Principles for
Building a Socialist Society with an Advanced Culture and Ideology, reprinted in 29 BEJIG
Rnv. 5 (Oct. 6, 1986 Supp.).
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pecting and another US $480 million for initial development. 76 The
seismic surveys covered eight large zones off the Chinese coast,
totalling 400,000 sq. km. in the South China Sea and the southern
part of the Yellow Sea.7 7 The total capital requirement for the
exploration and development of the South China Sea is estimated to
be in the order of US $20 billion by the early 1990s. It is claimed
that this figure is based on experience in the North Sea where the
capital expenditure for each million barrels per day of production
capacity amounted to roughly US $10 billion (in 1980 dollars).78 An
investment of this size plus sophisticated offshore technology have
convinced Chinese leaders that it is almost impossible for China to
undertake offshore exploration and development on its own. Chinese
officials believe that current Chinese laws on joint ventures with
foreign interests are adequate enough to assure the implementation
of self-reliance policy though a high premium is placed on the
maximum use of foreign investment and techn9 logy.
The principles of independence and self-reliance have been imple-
mented through a series of regulations setting out the rights and
obligations of the contractual parties and the controlling role of the
Ministry of Petroleum Industry (MPI). In essence, the Ministry's role
is to:
- determine forms of cooperation between the Chinese and foreign
entities and designate the areas for cooperative development;7 9
- map out plans for offshore oil development in accordance with
the long-term national economic program;80
- formulate operational and management policies;81
- examine and approve the overall offshore oil development pro-
gram.82
It can be easily seen that the Chinese have full control over the key
issues in the offshore oil exploration and development operations.
As we know, the form of cooperation has a direct bearing on the
host country's right over the management of resources and the sharing
of revenues between the Chinese oil company and the foreign con-
tractor. The development plan controls the pace and extent of off-
76. China Daily, Feb. 13, 1987, at 1.
77. Li, China's Continental Shelf Oil Potential, 16 OcEAN INDUSTRY 4 (Feb. 1981).
78. See generally Woodard & Goodwin, Supplying Offshore Services, CHinA Bus. REv.
11 (Mar./April 1982).
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shore oil development and finally, formulation of operational and
management policies directly affects the decision-making process.
These provisions assure China of its independent role as a host
country in exerting its sovereign rights and control over the exploi-
tation of this critical, strategic material-oil.
The Chinese claim that the principle of self-reliance is the basic
policy of any joint venture with foreign interests, and this is imple-
mented in the present Offshore Regulations through a set of regu-
lations providing for mandatory fulfillment of certain obligations on
the part of the foreign contractor and preferential rights of the
Chinese participants. The mandatory clauses include:
- transfer of advanced technology to the Chinese; 3
- employment and training of Chinese personnel;8
- submission of technological, financial and administrative reports
to the Chinese;8s and
- participation of Chinese personnel in engineering designs.86
The preferential treatment includes:
- priority right of Chinese design corporations to undertake master
and engineering designs under a subcontract with the foreign con-
tractor;8
- priority right of Chinese manufacturers to enter into sub-con-
tracts with the foreign contractor for the construction of facilities
for offshore operations;8
- priority right of Chinese suppliers to provide equipment and
material required to implement the petroleum contract;89
- priority right of .Chinese service companies to provide onshore
and offshore services under a service contract with the foreign
contractor.0
However, these preferential rights are conditional upon the equipment
and services being competitive in quality and price compared with
those provided by other companies outside China.
A glance at the above provisions will convince prospective investors
that China is determined to exploit its resources on its own by
building up its own capabilities through the mandatory transfer of
83. Id. art. 12.
84. Id.
85. Id. art. 13.
86. Id. art. 18.
87. Id.
88. Id. art. 19.
89. Id. art. 20.
90. Id. art. 21.
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technology and training of Chinese personnel. The process of gradual
transition from dependence on foreign technology and personnel to
full reliance on its own may be comprised of two or three stages,
with each stage of foreign involvement decreasing until the Chinese
are thoroughly conversant with the offshore technology and capable
to operate on their own. The Sino-Japanese cooperative oil venture
in Bohai Gulf provided a living example of such technology transfer.
The Chinese workers have now learned how to operate offshore
drilling platforms by themselves. According to a recent report released
by Xinghua News Agency, the Platform B in Chengbei oilfield in
Boha Gulf had been taken over by the Chinese for operation since
September 1986.91 The Offshore Regulations does not place any time
limit on how long foreign operators will be in control of the devel-
opment and production operations; and it simply mentions that they
will be responsible for the operations until such time China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) takes over the production op-
erations when conditions permit.92
Since the Offshore Regulations is basically a framework law, a
considerable portion of the terms and conditions will have to be
worked out between the Chinese and foreign contractors on the basis
of a model contract which goes with the package of other materials
to prospective bidders for offshore projects. In addition, detailed
rules and regulations will be promulgated from time to time by the
MPI whenever necessary.
There are some crucial points that call for tough negotiation
between the parties. One is the mandatory employment of Chinese
personnel in all phases of exploration and development and, secondly,
preferential treatment of Chinese equipment, materials, and services
provided that price and quality are competitive. As offshore opera-
tions require highly skilled and experienced workers in order to attain
maximum efficiency in development and production operations, for-
eign contractors are skeptical about whether the Chinese are capable
to live up to their standard. Besides, the cost of training Chinese
personnel could be staggering. The third concern for foreign con-
tractors is the possible delay which might ensue as a result of using
Chinese equipment and services, should such equipment and services
prove inadequate or unreliable eventually. Although the Offshore
Regulations provide for other options if the Chinese equipment and
91. People's Daily, Overseas Ed., May 24, 1987, at 3.
92. Offshore Regulations, supra note 64, art. 7.
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services are not satisfactory or -competitive in quality -and -service,
this can only be .proved after they are put to test. The Chinese
manufacturers and service *companies on the- other hand are fully
aware of this and are trying to reinforce their position and increase
their reliability - through establishment "of joint venture enterprises
with reputable. foreign manufacturers.
The joint venture -contract between CNOOC and .Norwegian Ge-
ophysical Corporation on the establishment of a geophysical dorpo-
ration was one such example.93 Another example was the 15-year
agreement for. the construction of oil -production platforms. between
China and a Paris-based marine .engineering. company., There -are
many joint ventures of such type in China's -oil -business: These
measures could have the effect of allaying to some extent the fears
of foreign contractors about the capability of Chinese manufacturers
and service companies to -provide adequate service.
It seems to the author that in the initial stage Chinese involvement
in the supply of offshore equipment would not be significant consid-
ering its current serious. shortage of energy and transportation facil-
ities, both .of which impose.severe constraints on its manufacturing
capacity. On the other hand, the Norwegian experience tends to
indicate that self-reliance takes time. The Norwegian oil and energy
Minister said during an interview with a Chinese Newsmen Delegation
in Oslo that Norway faced the same problems as.China is now facing
in regard to how to utilize foreign capital and -advanced technology
effectively without prejudicing its self-reliance policy. He-noted that
during the construction of the first oil well Norway could only supply
20% of the equipment needed with its..own manufactured equipment.
The percentage increased to 25% in the construction of the sdecond
oil well. and 60% in the.third, and -only by then did they command
the technology of deep sea oil development.9
Third, the mandatory transfer of technology is another tough issue
confronting foreign participants. Article 12 of the Offshore Regula-
tions provides that the foreign contractor "is obliged to transfer the
technology and pass on the experience to the Chinese- personnel.".
This includes design, software, and data gathered in exploration, all-
of which are given without charging royalties. -The provision will.
involve the foreign contractor in a complicated mesh of legal com-
93. People's Daily, Sept. 16, 1982, at 5.
94. Green, The Offshore Oil Contracts, CBIwrA Bus. Rnv. 54 (Jan./Feb. 1982).
95. People's Daily, Oct. 6, 1982, at 6.
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plexities under the existing patent, copyright, and other relevant laws
because some of the technology used in China operations may be
patented or copyrighted by companies other than the foreign con-
tractor itself. There is also the problem of to what extent the Chinese
can have access to the sophisticated offshore technology because such
technology transfer to the People's Republic of China (PRC) is
governed in the U.S. by the Export Administration Act of 196991
and the regulations promulgated from time to time by the Office of
Export Administration, 97 which prohibit the export of technology
and equipment to the PRC that might be of significance in military
use. Although there have been steps of some relaxation in those
restrictions in recent years because of the changing world situation
and Sino-U.S. common strategic interests in Asia, the problem still
remains.
Finally, the self-reliance policy necessarily implies Chinese control
over the decision-making prociss which is to be implemented through
the establishment of a joint management commission comprised of
representatives from CNOOC and the foreign company and chaired
by a CNOOC representative. This commission would have the au-
thority to oversee the entire offshore operation and make operational,
budgeting, and planning decisions.
The Offshore Regulations further provides that the foreign enter-
prise, as a party to the petroleum contract, shall provide "exploration
investment, undertake exploration operations and bear all exploration
risks." 98 The foreign contractor would bear the full brunt of risk
investment in the exploration stage and could turn out to be a
complete loser if no commercial oil field is discovered. According to
the Offshore Regulations, China will invest and participate in the
cooperative development only when an oil field of commercial value
is discovered. Thus, in this oil gamble China would invariably be a
"9sure winner," and the foreign company a possible loser.
The foreign oil company gets in return assurances from the Chinese
government that its investment, its share of profit and other legitimate
rights and interests will be fully protected by law.99 The foreign
contractor may export the petroleum received as its share or pur-
chased from the Chinese government, and remit abroad the invest-
96. 50 U.S.C. § 2401 (1976).
97. 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-99 (1979).
98. Offshore Regulations, supra note 64, art. 7.
99. Id. art. 3.
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ment it recovers, its profit and other legitimate income according to
law.'°° The revenues which the foreign oil company will receive from
its sale of the crude will be taxed in the range of 50070 under the
Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law promulgated in December 1981.101
The tax would be creditable in the U.S. according to a recent ruling
by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. 102
China adopts the profit-sharing formula in its cooperative venture
with foreign interests, according to which the foreign oil company
will be entitled to a fixed percentage of the "allocable profit oil,"
usually at the ratio of 51:49, with the host country's percentage
nominally a little higher to match its status.
The above is an identification of various interests of the host
country and the foreign contractor, with the host country taking a
larger share of the profit. However, in order to properly assess the
political and economic stakes involved in the oil venture in its true
perspective, it is necessary to go a step further and look beneath the
surface of things.
The real bargain for China lies in the exchange of natural resources
for foreign investment and technology. From the Chinese point of
view, the bargain was a painful decision and it took almost two
decades for the reformers within the Chinese Communist Party to
finally emerge a winner and that after endless political and factional
struggles both within and without the Party. Former foreign trade
minister, Li Qiang, categorically ruled out the possibility of foreign
participation in the exploitation of natural fesources in China when
he said in 1974 that China "will never try to attract foreign capital
or exploit domestic or foreign natural resources in conjunction with
other countries." 103
The petroleum resource, as distinguished from the fishery resource,
is non-renewable and, once exploited, can never be recovered. Because
of its strategic value and many advantages over other conventional
100. Id. art. 8.
101. Income Tax Law of the PRC Concerning Foreign Enterprises, arts. 3 and 4, adopted
at the Fourth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on 13 December 1981. Reprinted
in China Laws for Foreign Bus.
102. Brown, Tough Terms for Offshore Oil, CinNA Bus. Rnv. 36 (July/Aug. 1982).
103. Fountain, The Development of China's Offshore Oil, Ci NA Bus. REV. 24 (Jan./Feb.
1980). Even when the offshore drilling haa already begun, the struggle was still going on, an
indication of the tough battle within the ranks of the Party. A glance at the People's Daily
showed that the struggle between the radical and the moderate was still going strong in the
early 1980s. See People's Daily, Sept. 7, 1981, at 5; Aug. 6, 1982, at 5, and May 13, 1982,
at 1.
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energy sources, oil is assuming a more and more important role in
developing a nation's industries, upgrading the living standard of its
people, and maintaining world peace and security. For Chinese
leaders, the cooperative oil enterprise is impregnate with political
risks, and its failure could mean a serious setback not only to their
political life but also to the nation as well. Any balancing of interests
without considering the above factor would not lead to a proper
understanding of the political issues involved in the oil joint venture.
From the stance of the foreign oil company, the real concerns are
whether there is sufficient oil under the Chinese seabed for commer-
cial production, and how long the moderates can hold out in the
factional struggle within the Party. This struggle is not going to die
out in the foreseeable future. China's continental shelf is one of the
last big, accessible (average water depth 45 meters),' °4 and unexplored
areas in the world. The working conditions in China's offshore areas
are much better than in the North Sea. Prospects for oil reserves are
excellent according to the most recent reports from China. 05 China
claimed its potential oil reserves off China's coast to be in the range
of 14 billion metric tons. °6 Western geologists are more conservative
and put estimated oil reserves at about 78 billion barrels to be equally
divided between onshore and offshore.10 7
In any case, the fact remains that seismic surveys and initial
exploratory drilling along the Chinese coast fully attest to the expec-
tancy .of significant commercial oil and gas deposits in some of the
largest unexplored sedimentary basins in the world; The most recent
oil and gas exploration surveys conducted by Chinese geologists
revealed enormous reserves of oil and gas both onshore and offshore,
and Chinese oil industries are awaiting for the dawning of a golden
oil era by the end of the century. 08 That probably accounts for the
recent return of The Mobil Oil Corporation to China. Mobil certainly
does not want to be a loser in China's offshore oil development
venture.'09
104. Zhang, supra note 30, at 72-73.
105. People's Daily, Overseas Ed., Aug. 16, 1987, at 3.
106. This was the result of a 7-year extensive survey of China's coastal resources undertaken
by Chinese geologists. People's Daily, Overseas Ed., Feb. 27, 1987, at 3.
107. U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 23, 1982, at 33-34.
108. People's Daily, Overseas Ed., June 20, 1987, at 1.
109. Mobil conducted geological surveys in tlie Zhujiang (Pearl River) Delta area in 1979
before China started the first round bidding. These included gravitation and magnetic seismic
surveys in an area of 17,000 sq. miles. China Econ. News No. 27, July-20, 1987, at 2.
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V. PoLicY OBwECimWS OF THE OFFSHORE REGULATIONS
A. Maximum Utilization of Foreign Capital and Technology
.The Chinese leaders, after three decades of economic experimen-
tation and party struggle over the issue of participation of foreign
interests in China's national economic construction, have at long last
come to realize-that isolationism would not lead China to moderni-
zation and prosperity. In this- fast-developing modem world, no
country can -efficiently develop a national economy without the influx
of foreign capital and technology. The most impressive examples are
Japan, West Germany, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong
Kong. Chinese leaders, including the most powerful figure, Deng
Xiaoping, have repeatedly assured foreign corporations .that China's
"open-door" policy will not change and outlined the following three
basic principles governing the "open-door" policy:
- Adherence to self-reliance policy. The objective of importing
foreign advanced technology-is to reinforce self-reliance capability-
and develop national economy;
- To develop cooperation with Foreign countries in the economic,
trade and technological fields on the basis of equality and mutual
benefit;
- To counteract the foreign influence that is not in harmony with
Chinese nationg conditions and prevailing social and moral cus-
toms.110
A perusal of the Offshore Regulations shows that China is counting
on a windfall from oil business through maximum utilization of
foreign capital and technology ih the offshore oil development.
International oil companies will foot all the bills for seismic surveys
and exploratory drilling and do it at their own risk without any
guarantee of recoupment." .1 The Chinese investment will not be
involved until there are provei oil reserves on a commercial scale." 2
In addition, the foreign enterprise is required to use Chinese equip-
ment and services if they are competitive in price and quality, train
and employ Chinese personnel, and transfer technology to the Chinese
110. Vice Premier Wan Li reiterated the basic guidelines of the "open-door" policy at a
meeting with the Egyptian Journalist Delegation on June 18, 1982. People's Daily, June 19,
1982, at 4.
111. Offshore Regulations, supra note 64, art. 7.
112. Id.
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side." 3 This kind of cooperative venture, as China sees it, is the best
way to absorb foreign interests into its own economy. The apparent
benefits for the Chinese are: speed-up of economic construction;
rapid upgrading of technology and managerial skill; and increase of
employment.
China has launched a worldwide campaign for soliciting foreign
investment for its modernization program. In the eight years from
1979 when China began implementing the open-door policy to 1986,
China absorbed a total of US$16.2 billion in direct foreign investment
in more than 7,000 projects, averaging almost 1,000 projects a year.
In 1986 there were 1,492 projects valued at US$2.75 billion including
Sino-foreign joint ventures, Sino-foreign cooperative enterprises and
wholly foreign owned businesses. The actual amount of investment
for 1986 was 10% higher than in 1985.1
4
Sino-foreign joint efforts pay off in offshore oil exploitation. Since
China began to seek foreign assistance in developing its offshore oil
in 1979, a total of approximately US$480 million has been spent on
exploitation, of which approximately $230 million was invested by
foreign companies and about $240 million by Chinese partners. 15
According to the National Oil Corporation, 10 major oil and gas
discoveries were made offshore in 1986, more than in each of the
last few years. A total of US$310 million and 230 million Chinese
Yuan RMB were invested in exploration. Over the last few years,
320,000 km. of seismic lines were shot, 141 wells sunk offshore and
54 wells have reported oil or gas finds. In the past six years, US$1.94
billion and nearly 400 million Yuan were used for offshore pros-
pecting and another US$480 million for development." 6
Thus, from a long-range perspective, this massive injection of
foreign capital into Chinese economy will have far-reaching conse-
quences both on Chinese economic structure as well as on political
and social life. The Western influences and ideology will impercep-
tibly but inevitably reach into every nook and corner of the Chinese
life. Although Chinese Communist leaders are determined to coun-
teract this "bourgeois" influence through strengthening political con-
trol, its pervading effects can hardly be curbed. This is the biggest
risk China has to face in the implementation of its open-door policy.
113. Offshore Regulations, supra note 64, art. 12.
114. 30 BEmG Ra,. 4 (April 6, 1987).
115. China Daily, Feb. 13, 1987, at 1.
116. Id.
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The Offshore Regulations provides for mandatory transfer of
technology to the Chinese and priority use of Chinese equipment and
services where competitive.1 7 For the Chinese, these provisions are
the core of the Offshore Regulations and must be implemented
rigorously and in their entirety. The terms and conditions concerning
profit sharing in the cooperative venture are negotiable, but not the
technology transfer clauses. The reasons are evidently based on a
long-range objective of achieving technological independence and the
basic policy of controlling and managing natural resources on its
own. Thus, for the Chinese it is a question of strategic importance.
China's aspiration to maintain its leading position among the Third
World countries requires her to be not only politically, but also
economically and technologically, independent and strong.
In order to become competitive in its manufacturing of equipment
and services, China has over the years established a host of manu-
facturing and service companies for providing support services to the
offshore operations."" The purpose of this type of joint venture is
to reinforce China's technological capability and increase its reliability
and- competitiveness. In addition to these measures, China introduced
tax-exempt and preferential treatment clauses into the Offshore Re-
gulations for those equipment and materials that are imported for
use in offshore oil exploration and production in order to speed up
offshore oil development (Art. 10).119 This provision could have a
negative effect on another provision (Art. 20) calling for preferential
treatment to Chinese equipment and materials if they are competitive
in price, quality, and efficiency. The regulatory intent of Article 10
may stem from the desire to facilitate absorption of advanced tech-
nology by encouraging tax-free import of such technology.
From the above description, it is not difficult to see that the
Chinese offshore industry will be heavily saturated with foreign
capital and technology inside and out, and this would surely have a
far reaching impact on China's political and economic infrastructure
117. Offshore Regulations, supra note 64, arts. 12, 18, 19, 20 & 21.
118. A dozen or so companies have been established in recent years. They were Logging
Company of China, China Ocean Engineering and Service Corporation, China Offshore Design
and Engineering Corpofation, Nashan Development Corporation, China Corporation of Ship-
building Industry, China Aviation Supplies Corporation, North China Helicopter Service
Corporation, China Ocean Shipping Company, People's Insurance Company of China, China
Petroleum Logging-Dresser Atlas Cooperation Service Company (Joint Venture), China Ocean
Oil Services (Hong Kong Ltd.). See Denny, Offshore Oil Service Companies of China: An
Introduction, (July 21, 1982) (for internal circulation).
119. Offshore Regulations, supra note 64, art. 10.
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in the long run. The success of China's oil venture will in large
measure determine the viability of China's open-door policy and
other reforms. China has undertaken in recent years to modernize
its industries. Chinese pragmatic leaders are anxious to show the
world and the Chinese people that China can reap substantial benefits
from Sino-foreign joint oil ventures. Thus, failure in this cooperative
venture would have far-reaching adverse impact on China's move
toward the "capitalist" road and would provide an opportunity for
the leftists to launch an all-out attack on the current open-door
policy.
B. Maximization of National Revenues
Since the Offshore Regulations are basically a framework law to
be supplemented from time to time by detailed rules and regulations,
it does not provide for the financial conditions for foreign partici-
pation and revenue sharing between the Chinese and foreign parties.
The model contract' 20 sent to foreign oil companies whose biddings
have been accepted by CNOOC contains more detailed financial
terms and is of course subject to negotiation. Because of falling oil
prices and to attract more foreign investment in offshore develop-
men t, China has recently announced a series of measures allowing
for more flexibility in contract terms including a smaller proportion
of its equity shares in cooperative projects, reduction of charges for
contract blocks during the oilfield development period and lowering
the costs of employing Chinese personnel by at least 30 percent
compared with the standards in Southeast Asian countries. 12 All of
these measures aim at assuring foreign partners of a fair profit in
the joint venture.
In oil joint ventures, China has asked for one million U.S. dollars
signature bonus plus 12.5% royalty and an additional 5% production
tax.' 2 China has adopted the Production Sharing Formula by which
the foreign oil company will share a certain percentage of the crude
oil produced. Under this formula, the 17.5% of annual gross output
will go to the Chinese as royalty and payment of the Consolidated
Industrial and Commercial Tax, and another 50% of annual gross
120. For detailed discussion of the model contract, see M.J. MOSER, FoRaON TRADE,
I E AND m LAW iN mm PsoPiL's RP uBmc OF CHNA 186-94 (1984) [hereinafter
MosEl].
121. China Trader Weekly Bulletfih, Sept. 28, 1987, at 1.
122. Waiting for the Offshore Go-Ahead, FAR E. EcoN. REv. 65 (Oct. 1982).
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production is to cover the "cost oil" which includes operating costs,
exploration costs and development expenditures. The remaining 32.5%
will be divided into "share oil" and "allocable profit oil" according
to an x factor bid by the foreign oil company. .The share oil goes to
the Chinese side and the allocable profit oil is divided between the
Chinese and foreign companies by 51:49 ratio.'23 The Chinese have
developed a complicated formula of calculating profits by setting
eight production levels to which a variable factor will be applied at
each level:
.Level 1: under 500,000 metric tons (MT)
Level 2: half to I million MT
Level 3:1 to 2 million MT
Level 4: 2 to 3 million MT
Level 5: 3 to 5 million MT
Level 6: 5 to 7.5 million MIT
Level 7: 7.5 to 10 million MT
Level 8: over 10 million MT
The percentage of allocable profit oil is in inverse proportion to
output level, that is, the more oil you produce, the less percentage
you will get as profit oil.124 The model contract provides that, the
foreign contractor is free to export from China and sell on foreign
markets all crude oil received by it, whether as "cost recovery oil,"
"investment recovery oil," or "allocable profit oil." However, 'the
Chinese government reserves the right to regulate any such export
sales by prohibiting transport by the foreign contractor to "desti-
nations which impinge on the political interest of the People's Re-
public of China."'' 1
The Chinese want to get involved in almost every aspect of the
offshore operations and support services ranging from rig drilling to
supplying food for the rough-necks. The purpose is three-part: earn-
ing hard currency, learning technology, and reducing the unemploy-
ment rate. China will also face tremendous expenditures in the joint
venture. It was estimated that China would have to spend about US
$20 billion by 1990 in order to fund its offshore program. 126 After
all, whether this maximization of national revenues can be achieved
123. Brown, supra note 102, at 35; see also MosER, supra note 120, at 187.
124. However, some changes are now underway in respect to these changes mentioned
above. See People's Daily, supra note 21, at 1.
125. MosER, supra note 120, at 189.
126. Murphy, Industry Looks Forward to Chinese Oil Boom, The Oil Daily, May 4, 1982,
at B-3.
The Transnational Lawyer / VoL 1
will depend in large measure on the size of the recoverable oil reserves
under the Chinese seabed and the cost of extracting these resources.
As it is, both factors are still indeterminate to the degree of certainty
and cannot be accurately assessed until exploratory drilling is com-
pleted.
China's first round of bidding took place in February 1982. Since
then foreign companies have invested US$2.1 billion in China's
offshore, of which $470 million was spent on what turned out to be
dry holes.127 In the second round of bidding which began in November
1984, China signed eight contracts with fifteen corporations from
five countries including Japan Petroleum Exploration Company, Esso
China Ltd., Shell Exploration (China) Ltd., and Texaco Petroleum
Maatschappij from the Netherlands. 28 The companies were awarded
a total of 44,913 sq. km. in blocks in the basin at the Pearl River
estuary and southern Yellow Sea.'2
At present a total of 25 oil development contracts and geophysical
survey agreements have been signed for China's offshore waters.
Thirty-seven companies from 10 countries are cooperating with
CNOOC. Thus far, 33 oil- and gas-bearing structures have been
discovered, and two oilfields, one in the Sino-French joint exploration
area and the other in the Sino-Japanese joint exploration zone, have
already gone into production. Because oil finds in China's offshore
have not been very encouraging as had been expected, Chinese oil
officials are adopting more flexible approaches and are willing to
negotiate on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. 130 Thus, whether
China will be able to realize the objective of maximizing its revenues
from offshore oil ventures still remains to be seen.
C. Selection of an Optimum Petroleum System
There are four principal types of petroleum system that have been
used in the petroleum industry to govern the relations between the
host country and the international oil companies: the concession
(variously called 'permit,' 'license' or 'lease'), the joint venture, the
production sharing contract (or service contract), and full state
participation. In any type of these arrangements, an agreement is
127. Beijing Review article, China Awards More Sea Oil Contracts, 30 BmwtN; REv. 9
(March 23, 1987).
128. Id. at 8.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 8; see also China Trader Weekly Bulletin, supra note 121.
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necessary between the host country and the oil company whereby
rights and obligations are created. However, it is a special type of
contract, because one party to the contract is the state or a state
agency which has "greater power and freedom of action than a.
private party and has international status that gives it special rec-
ognition abroad for juridical purposes.
' 1 3'
Of the above four systems, the concession system has the longest
history and dates back as early as the 1920s when the international
oil companies entered into the Middle East for exploration and
development of petroleum resources pursuant to concessions granted
by the sovereign. The concession created contractual obligations upon
both parties. The oil company, being a concessionaire, was given the
right to explore for, develop, produce, and dispose of petroleum at
prices and rates of production determined by the company. As a
compensation, the host government received in return royalty, or
rents and bonuses. The concession usually ran for 50 or 60 years or
more. The host country had no proprietary interest in the petroleum
except for a small portion for domestic use.' 32 Thus, the concession
system is characterized by the oil companies exercising complete
control over the resources of the host country.
133
Although the concession system has historically played an impor-
tant role in the development of petroleum resources in most petroleum
producing countries which mostly belong to the third world, it has
lost its past grandeur and fallen into disfavor since the latter part of
the 1940s.134 This is mainly due to the growing independence of the
131. P.H. Martin, Host Country Controls in the Petroleum Industry, paper submitted to
the Regulation of International Business (April 12, 1974). As a juridical person of limited
liability, CNOOC will be responsible only for its own acts, legally and financially, and is not
backed up by its government securities so far as its financial liability is concerned. CNOOC
will also not be held responsible for any legal liability caused by its subsidiaries. This idea
was implicitly contained in the talk by a responsible official of CNOOC during an interview
with New China News Agency:
CNOOC is a state corporation of limited liability. Its regional companies are
subordinate to the leadership of CNOOC. They are only responsible for the operation
and management of exploration, development, and production activities within its
region and for the fulfillment of the tasks as entrusted by the CNOOC.
Interview by the person in charge of the CNOOC with the New China News Agency, People's
Daily, Feb. 17, 1982, at 2.
132. H. CATrAN, PRESENT TRENDS IN MIDDLE EASTERN OIL CONCESSIONS Aw AoAREEMENTs,
IN PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD - PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS N 1969
135.
133. R.B. KRUEGER, WoRD PERoIEUm POLICIES REPORT, ENERGY LAW SERVICE, MONO-
GRAPH 13C No.3 (Feb. 1981), at 3 [hereinafter WoRxD REPORT].
134. F. RouANI, A HITsORY OF O.P.E.C. 40 (1971); see also WoRLD REPORT, supra note
133, at 4.
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third world countries after World War II. They began to realize the
importance and necessity of greater state participation and independ-
ence in management of petroleum resources, the vital strategic ma-
terial for modem industries.
Against the above political and strategic background, the joint
venture has come into vogue and replaced the concession as the
principal method of controlling the relationship between host coun-
tries and oil companies. "The joint venture has become the rule and
the traditional concession has become the exception" as H. Cattan
aptly put it.135 The joint venture system was first started in 1957
when Iran entered into an agreement with the Italian agency ENI
and its subsidiary AGIP. 116 The joint venture can be defined as an
agreement under which the host country or a national oil company
and a private oil company agree to jointly develop and produce
petroleum with the oil company assuming all risks and burdens of
exploration. If petroleum is found and production begins, a separate
operating company jointly owned by the state and a private company
is formed to take over the joint venture operations. This separate
legal entity is then authorized to produce and sometimes undertake
the marketing of petroleum produced under the agreement. Costs
and profits are to be shared according to each party's equity in the
enterprise. Another form of joint venture is the establishment of a
management committee composed of representatives of both parties
to the agreement. The Chinese model contract calls for the formation
of a joint management commission composed of representatives of
both parties to the contract and chaired by a Chinese representative.
The third type of arrangement that has developed between host
countries and foreign oil companies is the production sharing agree-
ment or the service contract. 37 It differs from the joint venture in
135. Cattan, supra note 132.
136. H. CATrAN, TEE EvoLrunoN oF OmL CONCFSSIONS IN Tm MWDE EAST AND NoRTH
A.cA 129-32 (1967). *
137. The difference between the production sharing contract and the service contract simply
lies in the manner in which the foreign oil company receives compensation. The following
paragraph explains the difference in most succinct terms:
If the reward is the guaranteed purchase by (the contractor) of a certain percentage
of the annual production at a special (and sometimes) favorable price (and treating
the costs as a loan to be repaid by the national oil company with or without
interest), (or simply cash payments in some instances), the arrangement is usually
known by the general term "service contract." If the reward consists of allowing
the contractor a certain free share of the annual production (after recovery of costs),
the arrangement is usually known as a production sharing contract, Zakariya, New
Directions in the Search for and Development of Petroleum Resources in the
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that no jointly-owned company is created, and title to the petroleum
produced is vested in the host country until it is disposed of either
by selling to the foreign company or marketing abroad. The foreign
company actually acts as a contractor to the host country and bears
production, exploration, and development expenses and receives in
return a certain percentage of the annual production (after recovery
of cost),, or a guaranteed price for a fixed share of the production
depending on the agreement. 38 The contractor will also be given the
opportunity to market the petroleum produced for a commission. 39
. The fourth type of arrangement is the state participation or own-
ership which takes the form of state owned entities conducting
exploratory operations and private companies playing an- advisory
role as independent contractors, or of private companies financing
and conducting operations until commercial production begins when
the national oil company takes over the operation, and the contractor
is reimbursed accordingly and paid a fee "based on a formula of
price and production volume.' 140
The greatest advantage the concession system can offer is that the
state assumes no financial risk and administration is relatively simple
compared with .other systems. If the host country could manage to
obtain substantial bonuses .and greater royalty accompanied with
higher taxation through competitive allocation, revenues to the state
could be very significant. The major disadvantage lies in the loss of
total control by the host government over the nation's natural re-
sources. The host country is excluded from participating -in managing
and developing policy for her petroleum resources, and this could
bring about damaging effects to her national interests as a whole in
the long run. Also, because the host country is excluded from
participating in resource management and decision-making, there is
virtually no opportunity for her nationals to learn all facets of
management and operation in petroleum development. This would
Developing Countries, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 563 (1976).
It was Indonesia which first .developed the concept of production sharing contract in 1966,
and since then the system has been adopted in as many as 15 other countries, including Egypt,
Libya, Nigeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, South Yemen, India, Bangladesh, Burma, Malaysia,
Sri Lanka, Philippines, Peru, Bolivia, and Uruguay. Id. at 565. The production sharing concept
is regarded as an important step toward reconciling national and international interests in
natural resource development.
138. WoaRn REPORT, supra note 133, at 15.
139. Lucas, Doing Petroleum Business Abroad, 24th. Oil & Gas Inst. 295, 353-57 (Matthew
Bender 1973).
140. World Report, supra note 133, at 15-17.
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adversely affect the host country's self-reliance policy of developing
natural resources on its own in the future.
The joint venture system overcomes the above defects by allowing
the host country greater control over petroleum operations while the
oil company still takes the financial risks of exploration. Under the
joint venture format, arrangements can also be made between the
host country and the oil company for the former to become the
operator at regular intervals, say five years, as in the case of an
agreement entered into between the Chinese Petroleum Corporation
of Taiwan and Continental Oil Company of Taiwan. The right to
operate actually alternates between the government and the oil com-
pany. Arrangements could also be made for all important matters to
be decided by a committee composed of representatives from both
parties. The most important advantage of the joint venture is the
opportunity it presents for the nationals of the host country to
acquire technical and managerial skills in petroleum operations at
various levels, including technical, supervisorial and managerial.
In a joint venture the private oil company assumes only the
financial risks of exploration and the host country has to bear its
share of operating expenses when commercial production starts, thus
subjecting the host country to sharing risk with the foreign oil
company because of oil market price risks and production cost
uncertainties.
The production sharing formula exempts the host government from
any financial commitments in connection with petroleum operations
while at the same time allowing the state to participate in the control
of petroleum operations. The host country will receive an agreed-
upon minimum share of production, regardless of how much the oil
company will have to pay for its exploratory and development costs.
According to the Offshore Regulations the foreign oil company shall
provide exploration investment and bear exploration risks, and the
Chinese will invest in the cooperative venture only after a commercial
oil/gas field is discovered.
The above is a general survey of the various petroleum systems
now in use among oil producer countries. However, it should be
pointed out that any of these systems can be modified to incorporate
certain features of the other system according to the economic realities
and policy objectives of the country involved in order to produce
best results.
In recent years the trend has been toward greater participation of
the state in the petroleum resource development, solely because the
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producer countries have perceived the need of controlling this critical
resource in order to strengthen their economic and strategic positions
in the world arena. As the World Petroleum Policies Report 41 points
out, the concept of direct state participation in the development of
petroleum resources has been widely accepted and implemented in
many parts of the world, and both developing and developed coun-
tries have enacted laws and acts that assure them of direct partici-
pation in the management of petroleum operations, including the
power of determining the rate, price, and distribution of production.
Even the United States which has traditionally favored the concession
system is now beginning to explore options whereby the government
would have an operating interest. The degree of success achieved by
the various systems as adopted by different countries varies greatly,
and this in large measure "reflects the petroleum potential and the
bargaining strengths of the countries involved".
1 42
There are positive aspects of the joint venture system (JVS) and
profit sharing system (PSS) which are very attractive to a host country
like China which has not enough hard currency to finance its oil
development and will have to depend in a large measure upon
compensatioji arrangement, i.e. repayment in oil. The Profit Sharing
System is also consistent with China's avowed policy of self-reliance
in its economic construction because the host country enjoys the
exclusive right over the management of its natural resources and
ultimate control on matters of importance in petroleum operations.
These advantages are important to China as an emerging world
power with its burgeoning energy needs and ambitious drive for
economic development. The integration of joint venture and profit
sharing systems not only offers possibilities to meet China's expand-
ing energy needs and update its technology, but also assures a steady
income of foreign currency through various support services to
foreign contractors and subcontractors. As the host country controls
the resources and the management of oil operations, the system is
consistent with the basic thrust of China's development strategy and
long-term offshore petroleum development.
Whether the Chinese system, being a mixture of pr6duction sharing
and joint venture systems and conceived on the Indonesian model
and Norwegian practices, can ultimately fulfill the basic objective of
achieving timely and efficient exploration, development, and "produe-
141. Id. at 5-6.
142. Id. at 34-35.
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tion of offshore petroleum resources and generating maximum rev-
enue to China and a fair return to the foreign oil company still
remains to be seen. It is because there are still many unknowns which
make it virtually impossible to predict what the Chinese government
and the foreign oil company may get from the cooperative venture.
Among the most important of these unknowns are the number of
commercial oil fields which may be found off the Chinese coast and
the size of such fields, the price of oil and gas in the future, and
the ultimate investment and operating costs required. Also, variable
operating costs will eventually determine the actual production rate
and affect the decision to continue or terminate production. As
discussed above, the Chinese have developed a complicated formula
of calculating profits according to a variable factor which applies to
different levels of production in reverse order. Following this for-
mula, the percentage of allocable profit oil is "in inverse proportion
to output level: the more oil poduced, the less goes to profit oil."'1
43
Whether this profit-sharing formula would enhance efficient resource
recovery and provide sufficient incentives to the foreign oil companies
to carry out the work is difficult to say at the moment. It is a
question of how to strike a proper balance between securing a fair
return to the host country for the lease of its offshore fields and
providing the incentive of a fair profit to the oil companies which
bear the risk of investing billions of dollars in this highly risky
business.
VI. PROTECTION OF MARINE ENVIRONMENT
The Offshore Regulations contains an article concerning marine
environmental protection.lM This article calls for the oil companies
to carry out operations in accordance with the laws of the PRC and
international practice with a view to protecting fishery and other
natural resources and preventing the air, sea, rivers, lakes and lands
from pollution or damage. Chinese industries did not attach much
143. Brown, supra note 102, at 36.
144. Article 24 of the Offshore Regulations stated:
In the course of implementing petroleum operations, the operator and subcontractors
shall comply with the relevant laws and provisions on environmental protection and
safety of the People's Republic of China, and shall, by taking account of international
practice when conducting operations, protect fishery resources and other natural
resources and prevent the environment, including the air, sea, rivers, lakes, and
land, from being polluted or damaged.
Offshore Regulations, supra note 64, art. 24.
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importance to the environmental problems in the past, and they
rarely took the environmental factor into consideration when design-
ing industrial production and construction. The environmental prob-
lem is further aggravated by the use of outdated technology and
equipment in most Chinese enterprises resulting in high consumption
of resources and energy, and the generation of various forms of
harmful industrial waste. 45 There was, strictly speaking, no environ-
mental law in China until-the promulgation of "The Environmental
Protection Law of the PRC" (EPL) on September 13, 1979.'4 Most
of the policies on environmental protection work were sporadically
contained in talks by Chinese leaders at various levels. The prom-
ulgation of EPL represents China's first major effort to cope with
the ever-increasing dangers of environmental pollution, and to insure
smooth implementation of China's modernization program.
The EPL is in many ways siinilar to the United States National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and has 33 articles in all setting
forth in very broad and general terms China's national environmental
policy and goals. It includes guidelines concerning the functions of
the National Environmental Protection Office (China's counterpart
of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency), its local environmen-
tal protection units as well as their interrelationship.
On August 23, 1982 China promulgated its marine protection law
entitled "Marine Environmental Protection Law of PRC.2 147 The
law was drafted on the basis of "The Environmental Protection Law
of the PRC" promulgated in 1979, and spells out mainly legal rules
for the prevention of marine pollution and liability provisions for
violations thereof. It contains 48 articles under 8 chapter headings
and includes such main topics as:
- Prevention of marine environmental pollution and damage by
seashore projects;'4
- Prevention of marine environmental pollution and damage by
offshore oil exploration and exploitation;
49
145. People's Daily editorialist, Closely Combine Environmental Protection with Production
Development, People's Daily, Aug. 22, 1982, at 1.
146. The Environmental Protection Law of the PRC was adopted ii principle at the 11th
Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 5th National People's Congress on Sept. 13, 1979,
reprinted in China Laws for Foreign Business.
147. Marine Environmental Protection Law of the PRC was promulgated on August 23,
1982 and came into effect as of March 1, 1983, reprinted in People's Daily, Aug. 25, 1982,
at 3 [hereinafter MEPL].
148. Id. arts. 6-9.
149. Id. arts. 10-17.
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- Prevention of marine environmental pollution and damage by
land-based pollutants;5 0
- Prevention of marine environmental pollution and damage by
ships;1
5 1
- Prevention of marine environmental pollution and damage caused
by the dumping of waste materials.
5 2
The law provides legal liability for its violators who will be held
responsible, both administratively and criminally as the case may be,
and are required to pay compensation.
5 3
For the offshore oil operators, the provisions under Chapter 3 are
relevant. They require the operator:
- to submit a marine environmental impact report including effec-
tive measures to prevent pollution and damage to the marine en-
vironment before submission of development plans; 5 4
- to take effective measures to protect fishery resources where
explosives are used in offshore oil exploration and other maritime
activities; 55
- to prevent oil leakage accidents; oil residues and waste oil should
be recovered and not be discharged into the sea;5 6
- not to discharge oil-containing wastes and oily mixtures emanat-
ing from oil drilling vessels, drilling platforms, and production
platforms directly into the sea; the oil content of such wastes to be
,discharged after recovery shall not exceed the standards set by the
state; '
- not to dispose of oil-containing industrial wastes from oil drilling
vessels, drilling platforms, and production platforms in the sea area;
other industrial wastes shall be disposed in such a way as not to
pollute and damage the fishery waters and navigational channels; 8
- not to discharge oil and oily mixtures into the sea while the well
is put to an oil test at sea: 'steps shall be taken to have it fully
burned out to prevent marine pollution;'5 9
- to comply with the requirements for prevention of seepage,
leakage, and corrosion in the construction of offshore oil pipelines
and oil storage facilities in order to prevent oil leakage accidents;16°
150. Id. arts. 18-25.
151. Id. arts. 26-37.
152. Id. arts. 38-40.
153. Id. arts. 41-44.
154. Id. art. 10.
155. Id. art. 11.
156. Id. art. 12.
157. Id. art. 13.
158. Id. art. 14.
159. Id. art. 15.
160. Id. art. 16.
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- to install pollution-preventing facilities and equipment and take
effective technical measures to prevent blowout and oil leakage
accidents; in case of blowoit and oil leaks, a report shall be
submitted immediately to the competent authorities and effective
measures taken to control and eliminate oil pollution.16,
The above eight provisions apply exclusively to the prevention of
marine environmental pollution by offshore oil exploration and ex-
ploitation.
Under the chapter of legal liability, 162 the law provides that those
who violate the law resulting in real or potential pollution and damage
to the marine environment shall be subject to the sanction of the
competent authorities which will set a deadline for elimination and
control of the pollution and will require payment of fees and damages
to the state. They may also be warned or fined as the case may be.
Appeals from such decisions shall be made within 15 days as of the
date of receiving the decision. Individuals and units suffering from
damage as a result of marine environmental pollution shall have the
right to ask for damages from the parties causing it. -
Individuals and units causing the pollution may be immune from
paying compensation if reasonable and timely measures to avert the
damage to the environment proved ineffectual due to one of the
following situations:
1. Act of war;
2. Force majeure and natural disaster;
3. Negligence on the part of those in charge of the lighthouse or
other navigational aid equipment.' 63
The violator of the law may be subject to criminal prosecution if he
is directly responsible for causing pollution and damage to the marine
environment resulting in severe loss to private or public property or
deaths.16 The law went into force on March 1, 1983.
It should be noted that the present law is a general framework
law with the emphasis on pollution prevention and protection of the
marine environment in general. Separate laws will be promulgated
governing protection of mineral and aquatic resources. The law also
authorized various regional and local enviromnental" agencies and
governmental departments to issue enforcement rules and regulations
in accordance with actual situations.
161. Id. art. 17.
162. Id. arts. 41-44.
163. Id. art. 43.
164. Id. art. 44.
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VII. POLICY FLUCTUATIONS AND LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
Foreign investors are particularly concerned about China's political
stability and policy consistency. Actually, these two issues are one
and related to each other. In order to have a profound grasp of the
Chinese politics, one must first understand how politics work in
China. China is ruled by one party-the Chinese Communist Party.
All major policies of the state are formulated by the party nucleus,
the Central Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party. Due
to the existence of political factions within the Party, mainly the
Radical and the Moderate, Party policies fluctuate with the change
of personnel in control of the power machinery. It could be in the
hands of extreme radicals (like the Gang of Four), radicals and pro-
moderates all depending on the political thermometer of the day.
China's economic policies were mainly dominated by the leftist
(the radical) line since 1958. The leftist line advocated speeding up
national economic construction without taking into account China's
realities-its vast population and backward means of production.
They wished that China would become a modernized state overnight.
This unrealistic, overzealous and over-ambitious attitude toward ec-
onomic construction was the root cause of China's economic failures
since 1958. Such slogans as "to overtake the British and catch up
with the U.S.," "to realize modernization within 15 years," "to
establish ten Daqing oilflelds' 65 by the turn of the century," etc. were
reflections of this "leftist" policy.'
Since the factional struggle within the party and the existence of
different ideologies within the same faction are inevitable in party
bureaucracy and constitute part and parcel of the stark reality of
Chinese politics, it would not be difficult to understand why the
economic policies swayed like a pendulum from left to right and vice
versa over a long period of time. Even today we cannot completely
rule out the possibility of policy fluctuations in economic as well as
in other realms of activity given the theory of inherence and inevi-
tability of party struggle in Marxist ideology.
The second cause for policy fluctuations is the lack of experience
and knowledge in socialist construction. This is quite understandable
165. Daqing, the largest oil field complex in China, produced one million barrels of oil
per day, almost half of China's current oil production. Ondrik & Woodard, A Survey of
China's Land Oil Fields, 12 China Bus. Rev. 19 (Jan./Feb. 1985). See also supra note 17.
166. People's Daily Special Commentator, Correct the Guiding Ideology in Economic
Work, People's Daily, April 9, 1981, at 5.
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in view of the fact that economic construction of such a vast socialist
country with one billion population poses a formidable task for any
leaders in the world. Furthermore, China has been short of econo-
mists due to the erroneous policy pursued by the Communist Party
in the 1960's and 70's. People recoiled at the idea of being an
economist or a lawyer in fear of being stigmatized as a bourgeois
representative. This also accounted for lack of free academic discus-
sion about economic theories that are to guide China's economic
construction.
The third factor that affects China's policy decisions is the world
situation, particularly bilateral relations between China and the great
powers. That politics dominates economic relationship is clearly
demonstrated in the case of Pan Am Airline. In 1983 when Pan Am
wanted to resume flights to Taiwan for economic reasons, the Chinese
government formally warned the United States that the resumed
flight of Pan Am to Taiwan would have "severe repercussions" on
Sino-U.S. relations.'6
The Sino-U.S. relationship is now steadily improving due to Chi-
nese leaders pursuing pragmatic policies both at home and abroad
as well as in the treatment of the Taiwan issue. Should the Sino-
U.S. relations retrogress to the point of downgrading their diplomatic
level, it would certainly affect mass involvement of U.S. interests in
China's offshore oil development. Fortunately, this is not likely to
happen in the foreseeable future as long as there is a stable govern-
ment under the current Chinese pragmatic leadership. Chinese leaders
are anxious to show to the world and the Chinese people that China
can reap substantial benefits from its joint ventures with foreign
partners. Thus, failure in this cooperative oil venture would have
far-reaching impact on China's move toward the "capitalist" road,
and would provide an opportunity to the leftists to launch an all-
out attack on the current open-door policy. The success or failure
of China's open-door policy will determine China's viability as a
world power on the international scene as well as the viability of
current pragmatic leadership at home.
Fourth, domestic political instability has always been a prime factor
affecting China's policies in almost all spheres of activity. The inner
party struggle within the Chinese Communist Party wil never cease.
The recent downfall of the Party's General Secretary, Hu Yaobang,
167. Newsweek, June 13, 1983, at 66.
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from his number two position in China is eloquent enough to show
how vulnerable the Party leadership is in face of attacks from the
leftist diehards. 68 Although Deng's supporters are now in firm control
of the party and state machinery, the mass influx of new members
into the Communist Party alleged to be around 18 million during
the cultural revolution still pose a formidable threat to the present
leadership.169
Thus, it is not difficult to see that the Chinese policy-making body
is vulnerable to various influences, political, social, and economic,
which singly or jointly contribute to the instability and inconsistency
of Chinese policy. In the sphere of international cooperation, Chinese
leaders have repeatedly emphasized that the "open-door" policy is a
long-range policy andwill not change under any circumstances. In
offshore oil ventures, China particularly welcomes the influx of
massive foreign investment and technology. Because of the inherently
high risks incidental to the oil ventures and the long time span needed
to recoup costs and profits, the assurance of political stability and
policy consistency is of special concern to foreign investors. However,
as it is, it is still too early to predict how long such stability and
consistency can hold out.
Finally, closely related to the policy fluctuations is the Chinese
legal system which has emerged only recently over the horizon.
According to Chinese sources, China has issued 504 administrative
laws and regulations in the seven years from 1979 to the end of
1986, of which more than 340 concern the regulation of economic
matters. 170 However, to trace these laws and regulations would be
the toughest job confronting legal scholars today because most of
them have not been codified into a permanent book form for the
use of the general public. "The most important job now is to make
the law known to all in China" was the general echo of the delegates
who assembled at the 6th National People's Congress in April 1986.'17
Moreover, laws and regulations are subject to constant change and
revision in accordance with circumstances. It is extremely difficult
168. On January 17, 1987 General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Hu Yaobang,
was forced to resign following student demonstrations in December of 1986. The Communique
released by the Central Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party said that Hu
"violated the principle of collective leadership and made mistakes on important political issues
during his tenure as General Secretary of the Party." People's Daily, Jan. 17, 1987, at 1.
169. Chen Yun's speech at the 12th Party Congress (Sept. 6, 1982), reprinted in People's
Daily, Sept. 7, 1982, at 2.
170. People's Daily, Overseas Ed., April 27, 1987, at 4.
171. 29 Baumr Ra. 18 (April 21, 1986).
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for international lawyers especially to get acquainted with Chinese
laws. For example, the Chinese Constitution, which is the funda-
mental law of the nation, has already undergone four major revisions
since its first promulgation in 1954,172 and it all took place under the
same government and party. Some laws were repealed even before
the Chinese public knew of their existence. 73
The legal uncertainty is, in fact, a reflection of policy fluctuations
which are inherent in Chinese politics. There is no separation of
legislative, judicial and executive powers in China, nor a mechanism
of "checks and balances" to keep the government machinery healthy
and sound. In China, the Communist Party controls the state ma-
chinery and wields absolute leadership over all spheres of government
activity.
Ambiguity is another feature of Chinese legislation. Article 5,
paragraph 2 of the Offshore Regulations defines the CNOOC as "a
state corporation with the qualification of a juridical person ...."
However, questions arise as to the ability of CNOOC and its subsid-
iaries to assume legal liability and the extent of such liability in case
of litigations. Some oil companies have expressed uneasiness about
CNOOC's power to sign contracts and to fulfill contractual obliga-
tions.
There is no doubt that CNOOC has been fully authorized by the
Chinese government to take up the responsibility for entering into
cooperative ventures with foreign enterprises in exploiting China's
offshore petroleum resources, and as such, has the power to sign
contracts with foreign enterprises and carry ouit its contractual obli-
gations. Although the Chinese legal system is still far from perfect
and is trying to catch up with its legislation, China has established
its creditability 'and trustworthiness in international trade over the
years and is a reliable trade partner. In an interview with the Board
Chairman of Atlantic Richfield Corporation, Mr. Anderson, Premier
Zhao said:
The Chinese policy of carrying out economic and technical coop-
eration with foreign enterprises is firm and unshakable. Although
172. Wvu, Building New China's Legal System, 22 CoLuar. J. TEN sNAT'L L. 101, 116-21
(1983).
173. See, eg., Temporary Provisions of the PRC on the Prevention of Pollution in Offshore
Waters, reprinted in Selected Documents on Environmental Protection (compiled by the
Environmental Protection Office of Anshan Steel Corporation, a non-legal organization). The
Temporary Provisions were enacted in 1974 and have not been promulgated officially. They
may have already been rescinded.
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our legislation in this respect is not perfect enough, you may rest
assured that we mean what we say and that we abide by our
agreement.174
Chinese leaders seem to revel in oral guarantees of China's credi-
bility in fulfilling its contractual obligations even in the absence of
applicable laws. This is actually a reflection of the deep-rooted "rule
of man" mentality which dominated Chinese society for centuries.
Chinese leaders were used to substituting spoken words for written
law. This can also be partly attributable to the war years of the
revolution during which the Chinese Communist Party exercised
political leadership through its policy statements, because law as a
permanent form of legal institution simply could not keep up with
the rapidly changing situation in those years.
VIII. CONCLUSION
For about a century, from the 1840s to the 1940s, China was
constantly invaded and harassed by imperialist powers and subjected
to various forms of imperialism and colonialism as a result of unequal
treaties which degraded China to the position of a semi-colony.
During those years China was nominally independent, but in essence
a semi-colonial country. Its sovereignty was severely trampled upon.
Against this historical background, one can better understand why
China is so sensitive to the issue of sovereign rights over its natural
resources on land and under the sea.
For over three decades, since the founding of the People's Repub-
lic, the questions of safeguarding national sovereignty have been a
subject of hot debate within and without the leadership of the
Communist Party. It invariably cropped up whenever foreign assis-
tance was involved, either in the form. of "brotherly help" as in the
fifties when the Russians came in hordes to "help" the Chinese to
reconstruct the war-tom country, or in the form of joint ventures as
in the late seventies when the moderates openly advocated the par-
ticipation of foreign interests in the development of national resources
under the sea. Even until today, this struggle is still going on though
with less momentum and openness.' 75
174. People's Daily, Sept. 19, 1982, at 1.
175. Chu & Tung, Joint Ventures with ForeignersAre Advantageous to Socialist Enterprises,
People's Daily, Aug. 6, 1982, at 5.
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In November 1970 when Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan made
public their joint development project in the East China Sea,1 76 China
broke her long silence and launched a vigorous attack on the joint
project accusing Japan and South Korea of plundering China's seabed
resources, and Taiwan of "selling out the sovereignty and resource
of our country." 177 Had the attack on Taiwan at the time been
directed at the legality of its sovereign right to enter such a joint
development program, the People's Republic would have been in a
better position today to defend itself against any like accusation from
within and without the Party. However, as it was, the accusation
was "selling out sovereignty and resource of our country." Then the
question comes up. Does the legality of the PRC government to form
joint ventures with foreign entities to exploit China's offshore oil
resources change by one iota the nature of the substance of the deal?
Judging from the statements of the Chinese leaders issued before
the downfall of the "Gang of Four," the answer is "no." Typical
of the example was the statement by the former foreign trade
minister, Li Qiang, who categorically ruled out the possibility of
foreign participation in the exploitation of natural resources in China
when he said in 1974 that China "will never try to attract foreign
capital or exploit domestic or foreign natural resources in conjunction
with other countries."' 178 Thus, it is evident that a policy reversal has
taken place since then.
Against the above backdrop, the PRC is now overly careful in
conducting its negotiations with foreign corporations on the joint
development of offshore petroleum resources. This overreaction is
not without ground when viewed against the long and drawn-out
struggle between the two opposing factions, radicals and moderates,
within the party hierarchy.
With the complete reversal of policy on foreign investment in
China, the crucial issue then is to what extent the open-door policy
will reap benefits to the nation and the people as a whole. This will
176. On November 12, 1970 a liaison committee composed of Japanese, Taiwanese and
South Korean representatives was established in Seoul. They declared that beginning 1971 they
would jointly exploit the undersea oil in the water areas around Taiwan Province and its
appendant islands and in the shallow waters close to China and Korea. See, U.S. & Japanese
Reactionaries Out to Plunder Chinese and Korean Seabed Resources, Peking Rev., No. 50,
Dec. 11, 1970 at 15.
177. People's Daily Commentator, Plunder of China's Seabed and Subsoil Resources by
U.S. and Japanese Reactionaries Will Never Be Allowed, Peking Rev., No. 1, Jan. 1, 1971,
at 22.
178. Fountain, The Development of China's Offshore Oil, CnmA Bus. REv. 24 (Jan./Feb.
1980).
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have to be assessed against the political, social, economic and ideo-
logical aspects of the policy. A major policy failure in any one of
these aspects could paralyze, if not topple, the present cabinet and
lead to an overall reassessment of its policies in the domestic economic
construction.
Although a complete reversal of the open-door policy might not
be likely, major policy revisions in the direction of less reliance on
foreign investment and technology, more emphasis on self-reliance
and more control on people's ideology would be possible depending
on the balance of conservative and reformist forces then existing
within the party. The bourgeois influence on the Chinese life style
and ideology as a necessary evil accompanying the influx of massive
foreign capital, technology and personnel is the biggest challenge
Chinese leaders have to face in the next few decades. The Communist
Party Leaders are fully aware that proliferation of bourgeois ideology
among Chinese people will pose a direct threat to the existence of
the Communist regime in China in the long run.
Recently the Chinese Communist Party made a big fanfare about
the political reform. However, a closer look at its essence revealed
nothing more than establishing a system which would be, according
to Zhao's report, "conducive to increasing efficiency, strengthening
nation's vitality and bringing every positive factor into play. ' 179 On
the most crucial issue of separating Party leadership from government
leadership, Zhao categorically ruled out the possibility of introducing
"separation of powers" into the Chinese political system saying that
it is inconsistent with the socialist democracy of Chinese character-
istics.8 0 In other words, the Party will continue to exercise leadership
in all spheres of government activity.
People have already begun worrying about what would happen in
China when the strongman, Deng Xiaoping, passed out of the scene.
Would the present leaders have sufficient clout and prestige to control
the Party and the Army? Would the current policy on foreign
179. The General Secretary of Chinese Communists Party, Zhao Ziyang's report to the
13th Chinese Communist Party Congress held in Beijing, Oct. 26-Nov. 1, 1987, reprinted in
People's Daily, Overseas Ed., Oct. 27, 1987, at 1.
180. With regard to separation of the Party from the Government, Zhao said that the
main form of exercising the Party's leadership over the government is making the Party's
views become law through legal process. The Central Committee of the Party shall make
important decisions in respect to matters relating to domestic, diplomatic, economic and
defense policies, and recommend candidates for leadership positions in the nation's highest
organ of state power and exercise political leadership in every aspect of the governments work.
People's Daily, Overseas Ed., Oct. 26, 1987, at 4.
1988 / China's Offshore Oil Development Policy and Legislation
participation in China's resource development still prevail? Would
the foreign assets be nationalized? Given the current world and
domestic situation in China with the moderates at the helm and
massive experimentation of joint ventures just beginning to show
some positive results, one feels a. bit at ease investing in China, at
least in the foreseeable future.

